The public-private distinction as a special relevance to women’s rights: Part III

Focusing on violent pornography, bodily autonomy and consent.

In part I, in section I, l outlined the liberal view that the public-private distinction should be protected because it protects the autonomy of free choices. However, I countered this by arguing that though pornography can liberate some women in sex work, it does not consider that so-called free choice is made under conditions of restricted choice (due to injustice/inequality). So, while these free choices may seem autonomous, they are actually due to adaptive preferences. I then considered the objection that adaptive preferences illuminate that everything one believes and desires are adaptive preferences. However, I argued that the difference is that these adaptive preferences of porn, unlike others, are due to unjust positions/conventions and perpetuate women in roles of disempowerment.

In Section II, I built on the concept of adaptive preferences by arguing that the concept of bodily autonomy is a solution for ensuring that protections for women are upheld when abandoning the public-private distinction. I considered the objection that if bodily autonomy is necessary for the respect of women, then surely violent pornography would be permissible if both adults have consented to it. Nevertheless, I argued that no matter how liberating pornography and sex work may feel to women, it still objectifies a woman’s body and thus limiting bodily autonomy. Henceforth, respect for bodily autonomy becomes an adaptive preference that all individuals become accustomed to utilising.

Finally, in section III, I will suggest that pornography further silences the needs of women as women do not always consent to the sexual acts that their partners prefer. Ultimately, I will argue that porn, particularly the way the economy of porn shapes society, skews the range of perceived available choices to consent to mean the private-public distinction ought to be dispensed to protect women's rights.

III. Consent

Pornography further silences the needs of women as women do not always consent to the sexual acts that their partners prefer. For example, when a woman marries her partner, she consents to the union of the marriage and not to any violence, domestic or sexual violence, that may occur within the marriage. He has been used to seeing such behaviour and treatment of women as a 'norm' in porn. When defining consent, I will be referring to choices made that are not influenced by one’s adaptive preferences.

In this way, I argue that consent does not include psychological pressures one may feel when deciding, as even under such pressure, one has a choice of whether or not to yield, whereas, with physical force, no such decision is possible. It may be possible that, in some cases of psychological pressure, the victim of pressure is so demoralised as to lose the ability to choose; this is not typical among adults. More naturally, in the case of psychological pressure, the victim is not forced to have sex. Rather, she chooses to have sex to prevent losing a relationship, for instance, to avoid any confrontation or pain. In cases of physical force, however, no such choice is possible, and the sex becomes rape.

Using this definition, women choosing to partake in pornography or sex work means they consented to their actions. However, they may not have consented to how pornography viewers use their bodies. Moreover, if a woman is coerced into violent sex in the private sphere via force, she does not consent to the act of domestic violence. Within these scenarios, the woman has her rights abused as her right to consent is disregarded in the private sphere.

However, if a woman legitimately consents to a violent sexual act without psychological or physical coercion, it is a free choice, so the state ought not to interfere in the private sphere. For example, if a husband and wife consentingly partake in BDSM even if the husband grew up watching violent porn or if a female sex worker exchanges money for violent sex with a male who also grew up watching violent porn, the woman’s rights have not been violated. Hence, the liberals would argue there is no problem with consent. Nevertheless, the impact of watching violent pornography makes it harder for men to have an organic relationship and be comfortable with not objectifying women, whether through watching porn or having sex.

Though the idea of consent is vital for both liberals and radical feminists as it recognises the dignity and autonomy to protect citizens, radical feminists eliminate the gender role distinction by abandoning the public-private distinction and protecting all humans, especially women disproportionately affected, against harms in the private sphere.

Ultimately, porn, particularly the way the economy of porn shapes society, skews the range of perceived available choices to consent to. For example, in the Valdez v. Texas case (1992), where Valdez broke into a woman’s home, picked up a knife from her kitchen and ordered her to take her clothes off and sleep with him or he would kill her. As the woman pleaded with him to use a condom to protect herself from STIs, the jury considered her request to use a condom as consent for sex. However, this public-private distinction does not protect the woman’s rights of bodily autonomy or consent. In sex, consent is defined as a person not being able to consent to sex if she is not competent or if her agreeing to the sex is involuntary, such as someone agreeing to sex because they have a gun to their head.

In this example, the woman did not consent as she had limited options to value her consent to using a condom. Rather than agreeing to sex, the woman protected her body as much as she could, given the circumstances. Similarly, if men grow up watching violent porn and mimic such actions on their partners, women may consent to the sexual acts involuntarily from the options of either having or not having sex, which may be detrimental to the continuation of their relationship. In this way, there ought not to be a public-private distinction as women need to be protected when their rights of bodily autonomy are abused. This is not to state that individuals should not be able to watch the porn that they like or consentingly have violent sex with their partners, but the state ought to protect women from involuntary acts such as forms of domestic violence treaties as well as educating men on how not to objectify women, but build a culture of respect and equality of both sexes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there ought to be a dissolution of the public-private distinction as it does not protect women's bodily autonomy or consenting rights. This is especially illustrated in the case of pornography, and female sex work, as women are objectified as the 'Other'; therefore, dehumanised into sexual objects at the expense of men. Hence, women and their rights are deemed inessential, part of the oppressed group. Consequently, women are not protected from domestic violence that may occur due to privately viewing violent porn or coercing their partners into violent sexual acts. In this way, women are silenced into expressing their sexuality and protection from the state.

Therefore, I argue that the concept of bodily autonomy is a solution for ensuring that when abandoning the public-private distinction, protections for women are upkept as it rids them of their ‘Other-hood’. Henceforth, respect for bodily autonomy becomes an adaptive preference that all individuals become accustomed to utilising. Ultimately, I argue that porn, particularly the way the economy of porn shapes society, skews the range of perceived available choices to consent to mean the private-public distinction ought to be dispensed to protect women's rights.

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